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NOTES
SEALING AND DELIVERY OF CONTRACTS IN
KENTUCKY AND THE RESTATEMENT
According to Section 110 of the Restatement, a sealed
promise is binding without consideration. No specific statement
in any Kentucky case has been found regarding this precise
point, but it is believed that this was not the law in Kentucky
even before the Statute raised certain unsealed promises to the
dignity of sealed instruments.1 The Statute raising certain un-
'The Statute of 1812 Sec. 8, reads as follows: "All writings here-
after executed without seals stipulating for the payment of money or
property or for the performance of any act or acts, duty or duties,
shall be placed upon the same footing with sealed writings, containing
the like stipulations; receiving the same consideration in all courts of-
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sealed promises to the dignity of sealed contracts did not apply
to contracts for the sale of land and to conveyancs, but did
apply to a warranty of soundness contained in a bill of sale.2
It was held prior to this statute that a seal imports con-
sideration.3 The negative inference of such a statement is that
the presumption of consideration may be rebutted and that if it
is rebutted a sealed promise is not enforceable. This was prob-
ably the view of the Kentucky court. Evidence that this was
the position of the court prior to the passage of the statute is
furnished by the statute itself. The statute placed all writings
"on the same footing with sealed instruments." Had sealed
instruments been binding without consideration, this would
have meant that all written promises henceforth would likewise
be binding without consideration, and that result is obviously
unthinkable. Our court therefore, may have changed the com-
mon law in that respect, even before the statute of 18014 since
the common law rule unquestionably was that the seal itself was
the stamp of enforceability of the promise quite apart from any
consideration. 5 Pretty clearly, at.the common law a defendant
Justice; and to all intents and purposes having the same force and
effect, and upon which the same species of action may be founded as
if sealed." See Laws of Kentucky of 1811-1812 p. 180 Ch. 375; 1 Litt.
Dig. Kentucky Statutes (1822) p. 264 See. 8; 1 Morehead and Brown
Statute Law of Kentucky (1834) p. 343 Sec. 8. In 1843 a statute was
passed obviating the necessity of seals in other cases, especially as to
conveyances: "All and every instrument of writing hereafter executed
shall be as effectual and have the same dignity in law, without a seal
or scroll as with one; Provided: that this act shall not alter the law
requiring the state or county seal or the seal of corporations to certain
instruments as heretofore; and provided that a delivery of executed
contracts shall not be dispensed with by this act. Debt on bond may
be joined with debt on simple contract." See Laws of Kentucky (1843)
Chap. 42; Revised Statutes of Kentucky (Wickliffe, Turner and Nich-
olas 1851 and 1852) p. 196; Chap. 24, Sec. 5. The Statute of 1812 also
substantially reappears in the Revised Statutes of 1852 p. 192, Chap. 22,
Sec. 2; in the General Statutes of Kentucky of 1873, Chap. 22, Sec. 2;
and in Kentucky Statutes of 1894 Sec. 471; Carroll's Kentucky Statutes
1922, Sec. 471. The two provisions are now combined in Sec. 471.2 Tribble v. O7dhan, 5 3. J. Marsh. (28 Ky.) 137 (1830); Kirby v.
Chitwood, 4 T. B. Mon. (20 Ky.) 91 (1826).
a Bteele v. Mitchell, Sneed (2 Ky. Dec.) 37 (1801). Cf. Mclanaha
v. Henderson, 2 A. K. Marsh. 388 (1820); Hanna v. McKenzie, 5 B.
Mon. 314 (1845). An assignee may sue on a covenant between the
obligor ahd the assignor, Schultz v. Johnson, 5 B. Mon. 497 (1845).
' See next note.
*1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 205; Ames "Specialty Contracts and
Equitable Defenses" 9 Har. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1906). As to the law in
Kentucky however, prior to 1801, one cannot speak with assurance
since in that year a statute was passed to the effect that where an
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could not plead lack of consideration to an action in covenant.6
But it is not necessary to allege nor to prove that consideration
was given in those cases governed by the statute,7 though if the
consideration is unnecessarily alleged it must be proved,8 and
if that which is alleged as consideration is not in law consid-
eration, there is no further presumption of valid consideration.9
Though the statute purports to raise all contracts which
come within its purview to the dignity of sealed instruments,
there are still some significant differences between such contracts
and those that are sealed, in Kentucky. In one case,10 it is
stated that in an action on a note the plea of release is not
effective without a seal, thus intimating that a release might be
effective without consideration if sealed. Again it has been held
that if partners enter-an agreement under seal to submit to an
award, both must join." But if the agreement is not sealed
one partner may bind the other. That statute therefore, does
not alter the mode of executing such instruments. It is also
held that there are various distinctions still between these con-
tracts so elevated, and sealed contracts. For example a sealed
contract was wholly ineffective before delivery, whereas these
contracts may be effective without delivery. Thus, in Taylor v.
Craig12 defendant had signed a note as surety for X but deliv-
action was brought on a sealed instrument the consideration might
be impeached by a special plea. See I Morehead and Brown Statute
Law of Kentucky (2 Vols. 1834) p. 331; and the amendatory act of
1815, lb. p. 345.
For the Kentucky rule under the statute see Buford v. McKee, 1
Dana 107 (1833); Wilhite v. Roberts, 4 Dana 172 (1836).
'Bronston v. Lakes, 135 Ky. 173, 121 S. W. 1021 (1909); Moore v.
Gatewood, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 777 (1884); Snowden v. Leight, 6 Ky. Law
Rep. 118 (1884); Boone v. Shackleford, 4 Bibb (7 Ky.) 67 (1815);
Trustees v. Fleming, 10 Bush (73 Ky.) 234 (1874).8Drexelins v. Leathers, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 142 (1890).
$Noe v. Keen, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 928 (1884).
" Gibson v. Weir, 1 J. J. Marsh. (24 Ky.) 446 (1829). In Jenkins
v. Morton, 3 T. B. Mon. 28 (1825) a wife was not permitted to join in
an action for breach of covenant in which her husband was promisee
but the promise was made for her benefit. The statute had raised all
promises to the dignity of covenants, and in Kentucky donee bene-
ficiaries may sue on promises made for their benefit. See 18 Ky. L.
Jour. 101, 111 (1930).
uSouthard v. Steele, 3 T. B. Mon. (19 Ky.) 435 (1826); see Re-
statement See. 108.
2 J. J. Marsh. (25 Ky.) 449 (1829); see also Southard v. Steele
supra n. 9; a conveyance (deed) must be delivered and accepted; see
Cates v. Cates, 152 Ky. 47, 153 S. W. 10 (1913) ; Alexander v. De Kernel,
81 Ky. 345 (1883); Bunnell v. Bunnell, 111 Ky. 566 (1901). Delivery
by grantor of deed to be recorded without knowledge of the grantee is
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ered the note to Y with instructions to see Z and if Z should say
that he, defendant, could safely become X's surety, then Y was
to deliver the note to the payee; otherwise not. It was held that
defendant was bound even though Y delivered the note without
consulting Z.13 The court says that this would not have been a
delivery if the instrument had been a deed. 14 Furthermore, a
deed could not be altered by filling in blanks, but the afore-
mentioned statute does not prevent the filling in of blanks after
the instrument has been delivered so that the instrument is
avoided.35
An action in indebitatus assumpsit at common law could not
be sustained 'by the introduction of a sealed instrument as evi-
dence of the claim, says the Kentucky Court, and it therefore
holds that these promises raised to their new dignity by the
statute, likewise, may not be used as evidence in an action of
indebitatus assumpsit though that was possible before the
passage of this Statute.' 6 The action must be grounded on the
instrument. The date a sealed instrument bears is presumed to
be the date of delivery.17
A seal in Kentucky may consist of a scroll.' 8 This is the
rule at common law and by statute passed in 1797,19 and there
need be no recital regarding the seal in the contract.2 0
The Kentucky Court agrees that where the word "seal" is
written after the name of one co-obligor and not after the name
not a delivery but it may be prima facie evidence of delivery. Where
the deed was found unrecorded sixteen years later in the county clerk's
office it was presumed to have been delivered and accepted. If grantor
hands deed to notary to deliver to grantee and latter tells notary to
keep it and obtain the signature of the grantor's wife, the deed Is not
accepted till that has been done; Ward v. Rittenhouse Coal Go. 152 Ky.
228, 153 S. W. 217 (1913); see also Jefferson County Bldg. Assn. v.
Heil, 81 Ky. 513 (1883). Acceptance is presumed from a delivery to
the grantee who retains the instrument; Smlith v. Noble 174 Ky. 15,
191 S. W. 641 (1917). See Restatement Sec. 106.
But ef. Murrell v. Ameriean Ry. Exp. Co. 207 Ky. 322, 269 S. W.
293, 745 (1924).
"See Restatement, Sec. 102, 103.
'Bank v. Penice, 5 T. B. Mon. (21 Ky.) 25 (1827).
"Colyer v. Jackson, 3 B. Mon. (19 Ky.) 22 (1825); McDowell v.
Greenup, 2 A. K. Marsh. 568 (1820).
'7McConnell v. Brown, Litt. Sel. Cases, 459 (1821).
" Growning v. Behn, 10 B. Mon. (49 Ky.) 383 (1850); Restatement
Sec. 96.
"1 Litt, Dig. p. 254 Sec. 40; 1 Morehead and Brown (1834) p.
326, Sec. 41.
'2 Hubbard v. Beckwith, 1 Bibb (4 Ky.) 492 (1809); Restatement
See. "100.
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of the other, the seal may be the common seal of both, but
whether it is or not cannit be determined by inspection only.
Evidence is necessary on the point.2 1
A corporation may contract with an employee for services
informally2 2 and may assign an obligation without a seal,23 but
may not make contracts generally save by sealed instruments.24
It thus appears that in Kentucky, cases dealing with the
subject matter of sections 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 and 108
are to be found, but no Kentucky cases directly apply to sec-
tions 102-107, and 109. The statute raising certain contracts to
the dignity of sealed instruments is in conflict with the theory
of section 110, as all promises now must be supported by a con-
sideration, though in the cases affected by the statute, consid-
eration for the promises is presumed.
ALvIn E. EvANs
'Bohannons v. Lewis, 3 T. B. Mon. (19 Ky.) 376 (1826); Restate-
ment Sees. 97, 98, 99.
" Wa~ler v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 J. J. Marsh. (26 Ky.) 201 (1830).
0 Garrison v. Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh. (30 Ky.) 84 (1831). A credit
on a specialty may be entered and the plaintiff is not entitled to have
the credit scaled down though paid in depreciated currency. Phelps v.
Taylor, 4 T. B. Mon. (20 Ky.) 170 (1826.)
"See Long v. Madison Hemp & Flap Co., 1 A. K. Marsh. (8 Ky.)
105 (1817).
